Towards a Theoretical Understanding of Police Brutality
by JiHyun Kwon
Abstract
In this paper, the author analyzes the phenomenon of police brutality by dovetailing the following three theories to explain why there are only a few “bad-apple” officers who are responsible for ruthless acts, and why they tend to use excessive force against only certain types of citizens: (1) Social Conflict Theory, (2) Symbolic Interactionism, and (3) Control Balance Theory. The first two theories explain the necessary macro- and micro-level preconditions of the act of police brutality – which the last theory downplays. Her application of Charles Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to understandings of police violence provides us with deeper insight into how “control ratio” balancing officers consciously make decisions on whether or not to use excessive force given a certain set of preconditions. She discusses the applicability and shortcomings of each of the three theories, and introduces a new integrative theoretical framework for understanding police brutality.
The police force is one of the most visible features of governance in the United States. For about 150 years, the police force has been organized as a form of public institution entrusted with the duty of enforcing the law (Fry and Berkes 1983). In democratic societies, police officers adopt the role of social control agents and “accountability is [thus] of the essence” (Buckler and Unnever 2008; Punch and Gilmour 2010:11). Yet, for as long as they have existed, police departments have received a significant amount of public scrutiny over the issues of corruption, unfairness, overall lack of professionalism, and excessive use of force (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005; Lundman 1980; Walker 1977, 1992). With the increasing development of communication technology, the incidents of police misbehaviour and police-public tension have become ever more visible (Frank 2009). The excessive use of force by police has instigated a series of violent turmoil (Lersch 1998; Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005).
In light of these facts, one is left with three questions: First, why do some law enforcement officers engage in abusive behaviours against civilians despite their duty to ensure the public’s safety? Second, why are the weak in our society more prone to victimization from police? And finally, how do micro- and macro-level factors come to influence their individual-level behaviours? This paper attempts to contribute to the existing body of theoretical research on the topic of police brutality by establishing an alternative integrative theoretical framework. Throughout the paper, it will be argued that most existing theory-based research seeks to explain the processes only as a part of an interconnected whole. Thus, a more refined and prudent theoretical framework is required in order to enhance our understanding of the intricate processes of individual behaviours.
THEORIES AND POLICE BRUTALITY
The topic of police brutality has attracted a substantial amount of scholarly attention over the last few decades (i.e. Frank 2009; Hickman et al. 2001; Holmes et al. 2008; King 2009; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). Yet, many scholars assert that theory-based research has only recently emerged to specifically explain this police behaviour (Chamlin 1989; Hickman et al. 2001; Lersch 1998; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). There are theorists of various orientations who seek to attribute causality for police violence (i.e. Holmes et al. 2008; Jacobs and Britt 1979; and Westmarland 2006). In what follows, three of the more popular existing theories will be applied: Social Conflict Theory, Symbolic Interactionism, and the Control Balance Theory. I will provide the basic logic and the presumptions of said theories in addition to pointing out several important ramifications and shortcomings of each, by providing sufficient explanation for the cause of police brutality. Finally, I will attempt to dovetail these theories with a new integrative theoretical framework of police brutality in order to provide a more accurate and valid account for understanding the phenomenon.
1.1 Social Conflict Theory and Police Brutality
Social Conflict theorists maintain that the state functions as an instrument of the dominant class, “such as whites and moneyed elites” (Lersch 1998:82). Government institutions, including police departments, are the product of political processes which reveal the interests of the powerful of the society. The main function of the police is to preserve the status quo of inequality and to assist the powerful to exploit the powerless (Holmes et al. 2008; Lersch 1998).
Supporting this school of thought, which originated from Marxist tradition, Holmes and his colleagues (2008) found that along with the rational choice logic, Minority Threat Perspectives (a branch of Social Conflict Theory) “capture important external political influences on the allocation of police resources” (p. 148). They assert that the intersection of race and class together determine police-civilian interactional dynamics. Similarly, through the analysis of formal complaints, Lersch (1998) found that the economically marginalized and the politically powerless of the society were more likely to file complaints of police misconduct and to “experience more serious acts of misconduct” than those with greater power and more resources (p. 91). Jacobs and Britt (1979) also found that the Conflict hypothesis upholds when tested against the number of police homicide incidents: “the police were most likely to use deadly force in the most unequal states,” supporting the idea that the police act as control agents disproportionately in minority communities (p. 403). The death of Rodney King in 1991, which sparked the Los Angeles Riots by furious racial minorities, is one of the most highly publicized cases of police killings.
Victimization of entire racial minority groups is also quite common: numerous scholars have stated that police-citizen contact is affected by the race of the citizen – regardless of the race of the officers (i.e. Flowers 2001, Kane and White 2009, and Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005), and a rich body of empirical research supports evidence of police injustice against racial minorities. For example, using the 2001 New York Youth Survey, Buckler and Unnever (2008) found that African-Americans and Hispanics had disproportionately higher contacts with the police compared to their White counterparts. Consequently, they perceived much more injustice and unfairness in their relationships with the police, as members of visible minorities. Furthermore, as Fry and Berkes (1983) claim, American police institutions have adopted a paramilitary model in order to fight criminals who are perceived to be racial minorities. Also, the policing occupation remains to be “largely white-male dominated,” especially in the higher ranking positions (Hickman et al. 2001).
Thus, it appears that the effects of the majority-minority conflict, which some may argue to be a rather abstract discourse, do seem to influence the dynamics of police-public interactions in actuality, as the majority’s interest often imposes control over the minorities of society. Since the administrative actions taken by police departments greatly affect officers’ behaviours (i.e. Stephens 2011 and Lersch 1998), the inadequate measures of the departments to check police misconduct, which often occurs against minorities, may be interpreted as an inevitable outcome of the powerlessness of the political subordinates. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that the less powerful – especially visible minorities – are more rigorously watched by police officers and are disproportionally represented in the criminal justice system (Lersch 1998). As shown above, the existing inequality at play here is widely recognized and refuted by many. The almost automatic assumption that subordinate groups are composed of transgressors and should thus be controlled is also often present in everyday life interactions (Petersilia 1983; Walker 1994).
1.2 Social Conflict Theory and its Shortcomings
Despite the rich empirical support of scholars suggesting that police-citizen interactions are greatly saddled by the power dynamics of racial and class divisions, there are a few limitations of Conflict Theory, specifically in regards to it providing insufficient explanation for the acute phenomenon of police brutality. For the purpose of this study, I will only discuss the relevant shortcomings of the theory, which is that the proponents of this macro-sociological theory tend to assume that it is the external influence of the elite class which constructs and mandates individual police officers’ behaviours in their daily encounters with civilians. Although there is a merit in recognizing these interactional dynamics as influenced by social structures, exclusively limiting one’s understanding of the phenomenon to this theoretical framework undoubtedly over-simplifies the micro-level decision making processes of the parties involved.
For instance, Lersch (1998) found that only 12% of the police officers in a department received more than one citizen complaints per year, indicating that it is only a “small number of officers” who account for “a disproportionate number of complaints” (p. 94; Punch and Gilmour 2010). While the above studies may capture the general patterns associated with police mistreatment against the less powerful, none of them attempt to explain why these police officers in particular commit police brutality at specific times and places, while other officers in the police force do not. If the Conflict Theory alone could precisely explain the phenomenon, it would be only logical to question whether all officers of the overarching police institution act in uniformity to control the subordinate class, since the theory posits that police forces exist only to serve the elite’s interests, irrespective of the specific contexts that one may be placed in — this definitely and sensibly is not the case in reality as Lersch’s study suggests (Van den Berg 2011). Similarly, the theory also ignores differential organizational-level dynamics within the police institution. In his article “Police Discipline: A Case for Change,” Stephens (2011) lays out the various disciplinary procedures of different police departments which influence police-civilian encounters on a general level, as well as the varying degree of tolerance in police brutality amongst law enforcement officers.
In short, the questions of the causal mechanism of individual police misbehaviours cannot simply be answered by only recognizing the macro-level factors – such as class, race, and religions (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005). Likewise, the issue cannot be properly understood without further examining multifaceted cognitive, behavioural, and situational contexts. It is crucial to recognize the macro-level social structures in studies of police behaviour, as it certainly permeates the different aspects of our lives due to the political and structural arrangements. Yet again, because police brutality is always a product of individual level interactions, and “officers are able to select their victims … in many forms of police misconduct,” acknowledging the links between the different levels of analysis provides a more accurate and holistic understanding of this phenomenon (Lersch 1998:82).
2.1 Symbolic Interactionist Theory and Police Brutality
Complementing the Conflict Theory, Symbolic Interactionism can address unit and segment variations and explain why only some officers become “bad apples” and why some do not – the second pillar of the interconnected whole. The targeting of certain civilians (i.e. the politically marginalized) and the temporal and spatial contexts will be addressed in the next section. Hence, contrary to macro-level theory, Symbolic Interactionism emphasizes the subjective meanings and significant influences of socialization in explaining the patterns of micro-level social interactions.
As interactions between people, including violent encounters between civilians and police officers, are reciprocal on the part of two related parties, each party embodies its own reflected appraisal of the self, which subsequently influences one’s behaviours when engaging in interpersonal relationships. The concept of “the self” is argued to be greatly affected by the subjective interpretations and “reflection of appraisals” made by the reference groups (Matsueda 1992:1577; Mead 1934). This formation of self-identity is applied to individuals’ behaviours and interactions through “role-taking”, which then constructs the general social structures (Matsueda 1992). The theory also “stresses that people help to create their social circumstances and do not merely react to them” (Brym, Lie and Rytina 2009:19; Goffman 1959; Matsueda 1992).
Police and civilians alike learn to behave pursuant to the norms, rules, and expectations of a particular reference group. In the context of police-civilian interactions, consistent with the Social Conflict perspective, members of the minority groups and police officers are likely to be viewed as “rule violators” and oppressors respectively in the eyes of one another. The exclusivity of the occupational culture fosters the police apparatus to act as an officer’s situationally dominant reference group when any issue arises on duty.
First, under the precondition of the lack of appropriate constraints imposed by the upper body of the society, a police officer must have internalized his role as a control agent and that of authority in order to engage in the act of brutality. The state elites and the police departments portray the role of police as control agents and “crime fighters”, rather than social workers to serve public interests (Fry and Berkes 1983). Institutionalization of an abstract group identity, as Matsueda (1992) argues, is “the most effective form of social control” because people eventually learn to act accoringly to the expected code of conduct (p. 1581; Mead 1934). Society at large subsequently accepts their authority (whether willingly or not) and interacts with them in a rather submissive manner. Finally, the officers internalize their new occupational identity and enact their expected role to maintain social control in society.
As many scholars contend, it is the organizational culture and structure which significantly influence individual officers’ behaviours, as it “[teaches] them to internalize attitudes, values, and beliefs that are used to ensure that appropriate occupational and/or organizational behaviors are adopted” (Fry and Berkes 1983:226; Ouchi 1979). The degree to which each segment of the police force employs the “paramilitary police model,” embraces the soldier-bureaucrat identities of police officers and appraises the value of attaining control over civilians greatly differs (Fry and Berkes 1983). Also, the more an officer is exposed to other officers’ misconduct, the more suseptible he is to “slide further down the slippery slope” and take on the role of “brutal officer” – also known as “reciprocal role-taking” (Matsueda 1992; Punch and Gilmour 2010:11). As “cops never [engage in misbehaviour] alone, and the nature of their work turns police into highly social animals shaped by the collectives;” they inevitably engage in the rigorous re-socialization process and become part of the exclusive police subculture of the particular organization (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005; Punch and Gilmour 2010:10; Stark 1972; Skolnick 1966). The importance of re-socialization process was also evident in Van Maanen’s qualitative study of police shooting (Van Maanen 1980). This indoctrination process initially occurs through police training, and is further facilitated when the officers perceive themselves to be in the midst of social isolation from the ordinary population (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005; Punch and Gilmour 2010; Stark 1972; Westley 1970).
Although two officers may occupy an identical position within the same department, they may still differ in terms of their attitudes and behaviours when encountering the civilians. Hypothetically, if one inundates himself into the dogmatic role of a crime fighter and perceives marginalized civilians to be the criminals, he is more likely to adopt a hostile and abusive attitude towards these citizens in their encounters than another officer might. This is partially because he is more likely to preconceive and antagonize these individuals as he attempts to control them. In unfortunate circumstances, police brutality – which is “rooted in [the officers’] perceptions of power” – follows as a net result of the escalation of such attempts (Flowers 2001:2).
2.2 Symbolic Interactionist Theory and Marginalized Civilians
Although the “role-taking” of the officers explains one segment of the equation, it does not fully address many other parts – including the “role-taking” of the marginalized. So now is perhaps the time to question: why do the “bad apple” officers predominately target certain individuals, particularly those who belong to a marginalized group? Conflict theorists may argue that it is solely due to the account provided by the dynamics of power struggles: the socially marginalized are labelled as rule-violators and perceived as a threat to society (and thus should be controlled). Likewise, they would also argue that minorities who tend to be marginalized in politics and economics are also more likely to be dissatisfied with the status quo, which is unfair in their view and thus they attempt to rebel against the existing order.
Given the rich body of empirical findings of previous research cited in the preceding section, there seems to be a substantial degree of congruence between the Conflict Theory of power relations and the partial behaviours of police officers against political/economic subordinates. Yet again, the resulting violent interactions with marginalized citizens are not only enacted to maintain the status quo of inequality per se (though they are extensively influenced by the games of politics which occur at the macro-level), but they are also a result of baised self-perception and biased understanding of others on the part of the marginalized populations (Holmes et al. 2008; Lersch 1998). While the Conflict Theory provides an accurate description of general trends, the Symbolic Interactionist perspective offers us a fuller – though not complete – picture of the interconnected whole as it explains how the socially marginalized come to view themselves as the oppressed and as victims of the power struggle – just as the police officers come to assume their role as control agents in our society who wield a certain degree of authority as part of their occupation (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005; Smith and Holmes 2003).
To date, many scholars have supported the statement that “popular stereotypes conflate race and ethnicity and violent criminality” (Holmes et al. 2008:131). Becker’s (1963) notion of “master status” is applicable to one’s race in our society at large and police-civilian interaction in particular, as it carries significant stereotypes and influences one’s behavioural patterns in a sequential manner (Weitzer and Tuch 2004). Although “internalized racism is not so easy to see, to count [or] to measure” (Speight 2007: 131), a recent empirical analysis suggests that the internalization and the suppression of Black Americans’ personal experiences with discrimination emerged “strongly on implicit measures of perceived discrimination” (Carney et al. 2010:172). Recognizing this second class identity, racial minorities essentially take the “role” put forth by the dominant class – thus significantly influencing their interactions with others. Put together, when the police who have subsumed the controller identity and the minorities who have subsumed the victim identity interact with one another, tension and clash between the two parties becomes inevitable. Yet again, the concept of “role-taking” is still short of full analysis as it neglects the situational variations and cognitive decision-making processes which will be addressed below in detail.
3.1 Tittle’s Refined Control Balance Theory
It is critical to analyze the specific context in which acts of police brutality occur. In the previous sections, I incorporated the Social Interactionist concept of role-taking and Conflict theorists’ idea of social class and the power struggle in order to further our understandings of police brutality. In the following section, I hope to shed further light on how corresponding cognitive and situational factors may influence the likelihood of unpleasant police-public encounters and/or police brutality by referring to Tittle’s (2004) recently refinedversion of the Control Balance Theory.
Tittle (2004) maintains that the act of deviance is the “product of control balancing” (p. 404). Control ratio is one of the key causal variables; it refers to “the total amount of control [one] can exercise, relative to the control to which [one is] subject” (Tittle 2004:397). When the control balance is upset, the probability that one will engage in deviant behavior increases. Accordingly, when the “control ratio” is balanced, the probability that one will act in line with conformity increases (Hickman et al. 2001). Unlike the two previous theories, which placed overwhelming emphasis on social and political variables, this theory subsumes the influential cognitive motivations which one refers to as he/she seeks to maximize his/her “control balance desirability” in the process of engaging in deviant behaviour.
3.2 Control Balance Theory and Police Brutality
To date, only one study by Hickman and his colleagues (2001) has explicitly integrated the Control Balance Theory to analyze police misconduct. Recognizing the value of this theory, they attempted to conceptualize and operationalize its key concepts and empirically test it in the occupational context of a police force. They analyzed the survey data of Philadelphia police officers in order to examine whether the “control ratio” of individual officer influenced their probability of reporting their fellow officers who engaged in illicit behaviour. Results of this study supported the Tittle’s theory, and their research was a great leap forward for the study of police behaviour, as it introduced this new theory to a field which had previously relatively lacked theory-based research (Chamlin 1989; Lersch 1998; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). Yet again, although their findings were consistent with Tittle’s theory, their study only focused on officers’ defiance of the sub-cultural construct – “the code of silence” – rather than on the deviation from the code of professional ethics which seeks to discourage police from engaging in misbehaviour against citizens. Moreover, they substantially relied on the original formulation of Tittle’s theory (1995) which has been subject to a great degree of academic criticism (review Braithwaite 1997, Jensen 1999, and Savelsberg 1999 for the criticisms).
Being a theory of general deviance, despite this lack of existing empirical analysis, Tittle’s Control Balance Theory explains very wellwhy some police officers are involved in deviant behavior, including the act of brutality, at specific times and contexts. It serves as a useful foil to study police brutality and suggests that this ultimately is a result of police being on a “power-trip,” as it is commonly referred to. The theory fundamentally emphasizes the individuals’ desires to maximize their control over others, while essentially recognizing the complexity and multidirectional influences of the internal and external factors at play (Braithwaite 1997; Tittle 2004). Although this paper is mainly concerned with the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon, my integration of the theory – as a first attempt – will offer a solid basis for further empirical analysis endeavours in studying police violence. In order to provide a precise understanding, it must be examined complementarily with the two previously discussed theories which have explained the necessary preconditions of brutality: Tittle’s theory of control ratio alone does not provide sufficient explanation as to why only certain types of civilians are subject to much police violence, and it downplays the active role-taking processes of re-socialization which Symbolic Interactionists emphasize.
3.3 Applying the Variables of the Control Balance Desirability to Police Brutality
There are a few important concepts of the Control Balance Theory which need to be further elaborated in relation to police violence: seriousness, control balance desirability, control ratio, opportunity, constraints and self-control. “Seriousness” refers to the possibility of a deviant act to generate potential counter-controls, which will act to reduce one’s level of overall control. It is “a quality inherent to [the] deviant act” itself, but the theory also recognizes the perceptual variations and subjective interpretations across individuals in calculating the degree of the seriousness attached to a given act (Tittle 2004:403). “Control balance desirability” refers to a continuum which embodies “aspects of deviant behavior that bear on maximization of control manipulation, which involves long-range outcomes and effective escape from counter control” (Tittle 2004:406). This may be estimated objectively or subjectively when one determines whether he/she should commit a deviant act.
“Control ratio,” “opportunity,” “constraints,” and “self-control” are the four variables that determine the “control balance desirability.” The first variable consists of personal and social control factors which an individual tries to maximize. It is, as Tittle (2004) argues, the strongest determinant when interfaced with the fact of imbalance, as it “predisposes a person or social entity to become motivated for deviance” (p. 411). The “opportunity” variable acknowledges the basic fact that “deviant acts cannot occur unless they are possible” (Tittle 2004:412). Within a range of possible lines of behaviour that satisfy the “control balance desirability,” police brutality is only executable when there exists a realistic situational condition to victimize a certain entity. For example, attacking an African-American is unlikely if the officer does not come across any African-Americans in the area that he patrols. On the contrary, the “constraint”variable acknowledges factors that may set back the desired control balance ratio (i.e. loss of control) as a composite variable which encompasses the “seriousness” of an offence and the situational risks that are involved in the deviant act. This does not imply that objective rational calculation is in place. Rather, it suggests that one behaves pursuant to his subjective interpretation of his current level of control and the perceived costs and benefits of a deviant act (Tittle 2004).
This overall concept of control is an especially important one in the policing occupation, as officers’ roles in maintaining social order and controlling the population for law enforcement comes with their state-granted monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Fry and Berkes 1983). Permitted to exercise a significant amount of authority, they are also subject to a great degree of internal and external counter-controls (i.e. ones exerted by the media, the public, or the chief of police; Harris 2011). Inevitably, police on duty constantly debate the precise boundaries of the legitimate use of force and the degree to which they exert control over civilians. Put differently, if officers perceive greater risk of punishment for engaging in illicit violence, he will be less likely to abuse his authoriy against innocent civilians (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005).
Organizational subculture is an example of potential force of “constraints” within the police institution. If the subculture which the officer belongs to tolerates the illigimate use of force, it is very likely that he considers this behaviour to entail low levels of “seriousness” and “constraints.” In fact, informal social control seems to be one of the most critical factors that influences street-level officers’ behaviours, more so than other factors, since the nature of police work is that of “low visibility” (Frank 2009:734) and is subject to a “relative lack of [formal] supervision” (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005:561). These working conditions are evidently an indication and a result of inadequate checking and counterbalancing measures. This is in alignment with the Conflict perspective – the first pillar of the integrative theory – that the police institution is inherently oppressive and is the tool of the elites.
The notion of role-taking derived from Symbolic Interactionism also illuminates another factor that affects one’s pursuit for the “control balance desirability.” As such, when officers endorse the “crime fighter” self-identity, they are more likely to place their appropriate and deserved level of control higher. Organizational subcultures and occupational structures which emphasize the “crime fighter” image of the police force further heighten this tendency. The attitudes of citizens – specifically those of disrespect, disobedience, and hostility – may escalate the likelihood of an officer exerting disproportionate authority and aggression in order to reset the “control ratio” to the desired balance. In fact, many studies have empirically demonstrated that the disrespectful demeanor of a citizen is the greatest predictor of unpleasant police-civilian encounters (i.e. Friedrich 1980, Lersch and Feagin 1996 and Westley 1970).
In the context of minority and police interactions, the targeted group eventually absorb or assimilate themselves to the “dominant group’s version of reality,” and consider themselves as oppressed and the victims of the power struggle (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005; Smith and Holmes 2003; Speight 2007:130). Consequently, they tend to present more hostile and disrespectful attitudes towards police more so than their White counterparts (Black and Reiss 1970; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Sims et al. 2002; Weitzer and Tuch 2005; Wu et al. 2009). Thus, it is partially the demeanor and control balancing of both parties which result in violent altercations: where “both [parties] are anticipating an unpleasant encounter and the situation may escalate even though neither party originally [may have] intended the situation to deteriorate” (Fridell and Pate 1997; Lersch 1998:93). Thus, the police are acutely aware of the inability of the underprivileged to effectively and resourcefully mobilize themselves to exert their control over politicians in order to produce institutional arrangements to check extrajudicial force of the police. This constitutes the low level of realistic measures of “constraints” (i.e. risks to lose their control) as perceived by the police. Therefore, the previously discussed research support the argument that marginalized individuals are much more likely to be targetted as officers attempts to gain control.
Lastly, this theory also recognizes the function of emotion that affects this cognitive decision-making process when an officer determines whether to use illegitimate force. As Tittle argues, the more one is able to control himself, the more capable he is to accurately calculate the short- and long-term “seriousness” and the cost-benefits of control when engaging in deviance. This conception is called “self-control,” and varies from person to person. It is the “strong urge to do something right then, and they often imagine that certain immediate actions that they might take will feel good, will be empowering, and will turn their feelings from denigration to superiority”(Tittle 2004:415). In other words, poorly controlled officers are more likely to be provoked into an act of immediate violence by citizens who do not display the expected signs of obedience and respect. Altoghether, this last variable of “control balance desirability” and Tittle’s emphasis on subjective perception accounts for the individual variations among the police officers, which the two previous theories under-represent.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I have attempted to analyze the phenomenon of police brutality by integrating the Social Conflict perspective, Symbolic Interactionism, and the Control Balance Theory. Discussing the basic logic, the presumptions, important ramifications, and shortcomings thereof, I have dovetailed these theories to offer a broader and modified theoretical framework which explains police violence. The main concern of the paper was to explain why there are only few “bad-apple” officers who are responsible for such ruthless acts, and why they tend to use excessive force against only certain types of citizens given the political context of the society.
Social Conflict Theory provided a rich insight into how class division predisposes individuals by influencing institutional arrangements. The influence of political order on the institutional arrangement of police departments, and the heightened likelihood of the marginalized populations to encounter more violent officers has been presented throughout this paper. It built on the Marxist idea that the powerless are vilified as the criminals, and thus viewed as ones to be controlled. It was argued that although the theory critically captures overall patterns of what seems to be a political construct, it still fails to account for individual variations across police officers.
Symbolic Interactionism, on the other hand, was demonstrated to focus more closely on the mechanisms by which an officer comes to identify himself as a control agent and the ultimate symbol of authority as an individual. Unlike the former, the supporters of this theory see micro-level interactions as the unit of analysis (Matsueda 1992). Its concept of role-taking constituted the re-socialization process which occurs when an officer becomes a formal member of the police institution. The diverse forms and degrees of this re-socialization process in each unit that one is assigned to was pointed out as varying with organizational subculture. Although Symbolic Interactionists mainly view the social structures, or the institutional arrangements, as the product of on-going social processes, I took the perspectives of Conflict Theory to recognize that these arrangements are the product of macro-level power struggles. I argued that the constructed image of marginalized individuals as criminals and the police force as crime fighters must successfully be internalized in order for officers to commit violence against these citizens.
Lastly, the unprecedented application of the Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to the police violence provided us with deeper insight into how an officer cognitively makes decisions whether to use excessive force in a given situation and context. A fundamental quality of human beings – to desire the maximum control over others at all times – was demonstrated throughout (Braithwaite 1997; Tittle 2004). Similarly, police brutality was argued to be a product of police officers’ “control ratio” balancing processes. It was shown that the macro-level political bargaining processes principally determine the degree of “seriousness” and “constraints” on the possible lines of deviant behaviours. In a political landscape which grants the authority to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force but fails to implement a sufficient checking system to counter the excessive use of force, the re-socializing of the police officers to become “crime fighters” – rather than social workers – ultimately prompts them to victimize the powerless in their search for the “control balance desirability.”
In short, this paper thoroughly hypothesized why one individual officer may commit brutality at a given time and place. The first two theories had explained the necessary macro- and micro-level preconditions of the act of police brutality – which the last theory downplays. On the other hand, since neither of the two provides sufficient explanation as to why police violence occurs at a specific time and place, integrating Tittle’s analysis of micro-level motivations was essential, as it helped us bridge the gap while recognizing various emotional, cognitive, and situational variables. Thus, I attempted to provide more than a piecemeal explanation for the phenomenon of police violence. The insights gained from analyzing three theories together add up to far more than the sum of their parts.
While the analysis presented in this paper remains theoretical, it opens up new directions for future empirical research on police misbehaviour and violence against citizens. Given the multifaceted causal influences illustrated above, there are many possible ways to address these issues of police brutality—particularly, a policy recommendation which recognizes the intricacy of an individual officer’s behaviour and seeks to tackle the issue at all levels would be most beneficial.
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JiHyun Kwon
JiHyun Kwon is a graduating student with an Honours degree in Sociology and a double Minor in International Development Studies and Politics, Law, and Society. Her principal research interests pertain to the criminal justice policies and the ways in which they influence socioeconomically marginalized individuals. She intends to extend her knowledge of the field through studies in Criminology at the graduate level. She was born in South Korea and educated in Canada.
by JiHyun Kwon
Abstract
In this paper, the author analyzes the phenomenon of police brutality by dovetailing the following three theories to explain why there are only a few “bad-apple” officers who are responsible for ruthless acts, and why they tend to use excessive force against only certain types of citizens: (1) Social Conflict Theory, (2) Symbolic Interactionism, and (3) Control Balance Theory. The first two theories explain the necessary macro- and micro-level preconditions of the act of police brutality – which the last theory downplays. Her application of Charles Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to understandings of police violence provides us with deeper insight into how “control ratio” balancing officers consciously make decisions on whether or not to use excessive force given a certain set of preconditions. She discusses the applicability and shortcomings of each of the three theories, and introduces a new integrative theoretical framework for understanding police brutality.
The police force is one of the most visible features of governance in the United States. For about 150 years, the police force has been organized as a form of public institution entrusted with the duty of enforcing the law (Fry and Berkes 1983). In democratic societies, police officers adopt the role of social control agents and “accountability is [thus] of the essence” (Buckler and Unnever 2008; Punch and Gilmour 2010:11). Yet, for as long as they have existed, police departments have received a significant amount of public scrutiny over the issues of corruption, unfairness, overall lack of professionalism, and excessive use of force (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005; Lundman 1980; Walker 1977, 1992). With the increasing development of communication technology, the incidents of police misbehaviour and police-public tension have become ever more visible (Frank 2009). The excessive use of force by police has instigated a series of violent turmoil (Lersch 1998; Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005).
In light of these facts, one is left with three questions: First, why do some law enforcement officers engage in abusive behaviours against civilians despite their duty to ensure the public’s safety? Second, why are the weak in our society more prone to victimization from police? And finally, how do micro- and macro-level factors come to influence their individual-level behaviours? This paper attempts to contribute to the existing body of theoretical research on the topic of police brutality by establishing an alternative integrative theoretical framework. Throughout the paper, it will be argued that most existing theory-based research seeks to explain the processes only as a part of an interconnected whole. Thus, a more refined and prudent theoretical framework is required in order to enhance our understanding of the intricate processes of individual behaviours.
THEORIES AND POLICE BRUTALITY
The topic of police brutality has attracted a substantial amount of scholarly attention over the last few decades (i.e. Frank 2009; Hickman et al. 2001; Holmes et al. 2008; King 2009; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). Yet, many scholars assert that theory-based research has only recently emerged to specifically explain this police behaviour (Chamlin 1989; Hickman et al. 2001; Lersch 1998; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). There are theorists of various orientations who seek to attribute causality for police violence (i.e. Holmes et al. 2008; Jacobs and Britt 1979; and Westmarland 2006). In what follows, three of the more popular existing theories will be applied: Social Conflict Theory, Symbolic Interactionism, and the Control Balance Theory. I will provide the basic logic and the presumptions of said theories in addition to pointing out several important ramifications and shortcomings of each, by providing sufficient explanation for the cause of police brutality. Finally, I will attempt to dovetail these theories with a new integrative theoretical framework of police brutality in order to provide a more accurate and valid account for understanding the phenomenon.
1.1 Social Conflict Theory and Police Brutality
Social Conflict theorists maintain that the state functions as an instrument of the dominant class, “such as whites and moneyed elites” (Lersch 1998:82). Government institutions, including police departments, are the product of political processes which reveal the interests of the powerful of the society. The main function of the police is to preserve the status quo of inequality and to assist the powerful to exploit the powerless (Holmes et al. 2008; Lersch 1998).
Supporting this school of thought, which originated from Marxist tradition, Holmes and his colleagues (2008) found that along with the rational choice logic, Minority Threat Perspectives (a branch of Social Conflict Theory) “capture important external political influences on the allocation of police resources” (p. 148). They assert that the intersection of race and class together determine police-civilian interactional dynamics. Similarly, through the analysis of formal complaints, Lersch (1998) found that the economically marginalized and the politically powerless of the society were more likely to file complaints of police misconduct and to “experience more serious acts of misconduct” than those with greater power and more resources (p. 91). Jacobs and Britt (1979) also found that the Conflict hypothesis upholds when tested against the number of police homicide incidents: “the police were most likely to use deadly force in the most unequal states,” supporting the idea that the police act as control agents disproportionately in minority communities (p. 403). The death of Rodney King in 1991, which sparked the Los Angeles Riots by furious racial minorities, is one of the most highly publicized cases of police killings.
Victimization of entire racial minority groups is also quite common: numerous scholars have stated that police-citizen contact is affected by the race of the citizen – regardless of the race of the officers (i.e. Flowers 2001, Kane and White 2009, and Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005), and a rich body of empirical research supports evidence of police injustice against racial minorities. For example, using the 2001 New York Youth Survey, Buckler and Unnever (2008) found that African-Americans and Hispanics had disproportionately higher contacts with the police compared to their White counterparts. Consequently, they perceived much more injustice and unfairness in their relationships with the police, as members of visible minorities. Furthermore, as Fry and Berkes (1983) claim, American police institutions have adopted a paramilitary model in order to fight criminals who are perceived to be racial minorities. Also, the policing occupation remains to be “largely white-male dominated,” especially in the higher ranking positions (Hickman et al. 2001).
Thus, it appears that the effects of the majority-minority conflict, which some may argue to be a rather abstract discourse, do seem to influence the dynamics of police-public interactions in actuality, as the majority’s interest often imposes control over the minorities of society. Since the administrative actions taken by police departments greatly affect officers’ behaviours (i.e. Stephens 2011 and Lersch 1998), the inadequate measures of the departments to check police misconduct, which often occurs against minorities, may be interpreted as an inevitable outcome of the powerlessness of the political subordinates. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that the less powerful – especially visible minorities – are more rigorously watched by police officers and are disproportionally represented in the criminal justice system (Lersch 1998). As shown above, the existing inequality at play here is widely recognized and refuted by many. The almost automatic assumption that subordinate groups are composed of transgressors and should thus be controlled is also often present in everyday life interactions (Petersilia 1983; Walker 1994).
1.2 Social Conflict Theory and its Shortcomings
Despite the rich empirical support of scholars suggesting that police-citizen interactions are greatly saddled by the power dynamics of racial and class divisions, there are a few limitations of Conflict Theory, specifically in regards to it providing insufficient explanation for the acute phenomenon of police brutality. For the purpose of this study, I will only discuss the relevant shortcomings of the theory, which is that the proponents of this macro-sociological theory tend to assume that it is the external influence of the elite class which constructs and mandates individual police officers’ behaviours in their daily encounters with civilians. Although there is a merit in recognizing these interactional dynamics as influenced by social structures, exclusively limiting one’s understanding of the phenomenon to this theoretical framework undoubtedly over-simplifies the micro-level decision making processes of the parties involved.
For instance, Lersch (1998) found that only 12% of the police officers in a department received more than one citizen complaints per year, indicating that it is only a “small number of officers” who account for “a disproportionate number of complaints” (p. 94; Punch and Gilmour 2010). While the above studies may capture the general patterns associated with police mistreatment against the less powerful, none of them attempt to explain why these police officers in particular commit police brutality at specific times and places, while other officers in the police force do not. If the Conflict Theory alone could precisely explain the phenomenon, it would be only logical to question whether all officers of the overarching police institution act in uniformity to control the subordinate class, since the theory posits that police forces exist only to serve the elite’s interests, irrespective of the specific contexts that one may be placed in — this definitely and sensibly is not the case in reality as Lersch’s study suggests (Van den Berg 2011). Similarly, the theory also ignores differential organizational-level dynamics within the police institution. In his article “Police Discipline: A Case for Change,” Stephens (2011) lays out the various disciplinary procedures of different police departments which influence police-civilian encounters on a general level, as well as the varying degree of tolerance in police brutality amongst law enforcement officers.
In short, the questions of the causal mechanism of individual police misbehaviours cannot simply be answered by only recognizing the macro-level factors – such as class, race, and religions (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005). Likewise, the issue cannot be properly understood without further examining multifaceted cognitive, behavioural, and situational contexts. It is crucial to recognize the macro-level social structures in studies of police behaviour, as it certainly permeates the different aspects of our lives due to the political and structural arrangements. Yet again, because police brutality is always a product of individual level interactions, and “officers are able to select their victims … in many forms of police misconduct,” acknowledging the links between the different levels of analysis provides a more accurate and holistic understanding of this phenomenon (Lersch 1998:82).
2.1 Symbolic Interactionist Theory and Police Brutality
Complementing the Conflict Theory, Symbolic Interactionism can address unit and segment variations and explain why only some officers become “bad apples” and why some do not – the second pillar of the interconnected whole. The targeting of certain civilians (i.e. the politically marginalized) and the temporal and spatial contexts will be addressed in the next section. Hence, contrary to macro-level theory, Symbolic Interactionism emphasizes the subjective meanings and significant influences of socialization in explaining the patterns of micro-level social interactions.
As interactions between people, including violent encounters between civilians and police officers, are reciprocal on the part of two related parties, each party embodies its own reflected appraisal of the self, which subsequently influences one’s behaviours when engaging in interpersonal relationships. The concept of “the self” is argued to be greatly affected by the subjective interpretations and “reflection of appraisals” made by the reference groups (Matsueda 1992:1577; Mead 1934). This formation of self-identity is applied to individuals’ behaviours and interactions through “role-taking”, which then constructs the general social structures (Matsueda 1992). The theory also “stresses that people help to create their social circumstances and do not merely react to them” (Brym, Lie and Rytina 2009:19; Goffman 1959; Matsueda 1992).
Police and civilians alike learn to behave pursuant to the norms, rules, and expectations of a particular reference group. In the context of police-civilian interactions, consistent with the Social Conflict perspective, members of the minority groups and police officers are likely to be viewed as “rule violators” and oppressors respectively in the eyes of one another. The exclusivity of the occupational culture fosters the police apparatus to act as an officer’s situationally dominant reference group when any issue arises on duty.
First, under the precondition of the lack of appropriate constraints imposed by the upper body of the society, a police officer must have internalized his role as a control agent and that of authority in order to engage in the act of brutality. The state elites and the police departments portray the role of police as control agents and “crime fighters”, rather than social workers to serve public interests (Fry and Berkes 1983). Institutionalization of an abstract group identity, as Matsueda (1992) argues, is “the most effective form of social control” because people eventually learn to act accoringly to the expected code of conduct (p. 1581; Mead 1934). Society at large subsequently accepts their authority (whether willingly or not) and interacts with them in a rather submissive manner. Finally, the officers internalize their new occupational identity and enact their expected role to maintain social control in society.
As many scholars contend, it is the organizational culture and structure which significantly influence individual officers’ behaviours, as it “[teaches] them to internalize attitudes, values, and beliefs that are used to ensure that appropriate occupational and/or organizational behaviors are adopted” (Fry and Berkes 1983:226; Ouchi 1979). The degree to which each segment of the police force employs the “paramilitary police model,” embraces the soldier-bureaucrat identities of police officers and appraises the value of attaining control over civilians greatly differs (Fry and Berkes 1983). Also, the more an officer is exposed to other officers’ misconduct, the more suseptible he is to “slide further down the slippery slope” and take on the role of “brutal officer” – also known as “reciprocal role-taking” (Matsueda 1992; Punch and Gilmour 2010:11). As “cops never [engage in misbehaviour] alone, and the nature of their work turns police into highly social animals shaped by the collectives;” they inevitably engage in the rigorous re-socialization process and become part of the exclusive police subculture of the particular organization (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005; Punch and Gilmour 2010:10; Stark 1972; Skolnick 1966). The importance of re-socialization process was also evident in Van Maanen’s qualitative study of police shooting (Van Maanen 1980). This indoctrination process initially occurs through police training, and is further facilitated when the officers perceive themselves to be in the midst of social isolation from the ordinary population (Lersch and Mieszkowski 2005; Punch and Gilmour 2010; Stark 1972; Westley 1970).
Although two officers may occupy an identical position within the same department, they may still differ in terms of their attitudes and behaviours when encountering the civilians. Hypothetically, if one inundates himself into the dogmatic role of a crime fighter and perceives marginalized civilians to be the criminals, he is more likely to adopt a hostile and abusive attitude towards these citizens in their encounters than another officer might. This is partially because he is more likely to preconceive and antagonize these individuals as he attempts to control them. In unfortunate circumstances, police brutality – which is “rooted in [the officers’] perceptions of power” – follows as a net result of the escalation of such attempts (Flowers 2001:2).
2.2 Symbolic Interactionist Theory and Marginalized Civilians
Although the “role-taking” of the officers explains one segment of the equation, it does not fully address many other parts – including the “role-taking” of the marginalized. So now is perhaps the time to question: why do the “bad apple” officers predominately target certain individuals, particularly those who belong to a marginalized group? Conflict theorists may argue that it is solely due to the account provided by the dynamics of power struggles: the socially marginalized are labelled as rule-violators and perceived as a threat to society (and thus should be controlled). Likewise, they would also argue that minorities who tend to be marginalized in politics and economics are also more likely to be dissatisfied with the status quo, which is unfair in their view and thus they attempt to rebel against the existing order.
Given the rich body of empirical findings of previous research cited in the preceding section, there seems to be a substantial degree of congruence between the Conflict Theory of power relations and the partial behaviours of police officers against political/economic subordinates. Yet again, the resulting violent interactions with marginalized citizens are not only enacted to maintain the status quo of inequality per se (though they are extensively influenced by the games of politics which occur at the macro-level), but they are also a result of baised self-perception and biased understanding of others on the part of the marginalized populations (Holmes et al. 2008; Lersch 1998). While the Conflict Theory provides an accurate description of general trends, the Symbolic Interactionist perspective offers us a fuller – though not complete – picture of the interconnected whole as it explains how the socially marginalized come to view themselves as the oppressed and as victims of the power struggle – just as the police officers come to assume their role as control agents in our society who wield a certain degree of authority as part of their occupation (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005; Smith and Holmes 2003).
To date, many scholars have supported the statement that “popular stereotypes conflate race and ethnicity and violent criminality” (Holmes et al. 2008:131). Becker’s (1963) notion of “master status” is applicable to one’s race in our society at large and police-civilian interaction in particular, as it carries significant stereotypes and influences one’s behavioural patterns in a sequential manner (Weitzer and Tuch 2004). Although “internalized racism is not so easy to see, to count [or] to measure” (Speight 2007: 131), a recent empirical analysis suggests that the internalization and the suppression of Black Americans’ personal experiences with discrimination emerged “strongly on implicit measures of perceived discrimination” (Carney et al. 2010:172). Recognizing this second class identity, racial minorities essentially take the “role” put forth by the dominant class – thus significantly influencing their interactions with others. Put together, when the police who have subsumed the controller identity and the minorities who have subsumed the victim identity interact with one another, tension and clash between the two parties becomes inevitable. Yet again, the concept of “role-taking” is still short of full analysis as it neglects the situational variations and cognitive decision-making processes which will be addressed below in detail.
3.1 Tittle’s Refined Control Balance Theory
It is critical to analyze the specific context in which acts of police brutality occur. In the previous sections, I incorporated the Social Interactionist concept of role-taking and Conflict theorists’ idea of social class and the power struggle in order to further our understandings of police brutality. In the following section, I hope to shed further light on how corresponding cognitive and situational factors may influence the likelihood of unpleasant police-public encounters and/or police brutality by referring to Tittle’s (2004) recently refinedversion of the Control Balance Theory.
Tittle (2004) maintains that the act of deviance is the “product of control balancing” (p. 404). Control ratio is one of the key causal variables; it refers to “the total amount of control [one] can exercise, relative to the control to which [one is] subject” (Tittle 2004:397). When the control balance is upset, the probability that one will engage in deviant behavior increases. Accordingly, when the “control ratio” is balanced, the probability that one will act in line with conformity increases (Hickman et al. 2001). Unlike the two previous theories, which placed overwhelming emphasis on social and political variables, this theory subsumes the influential cognitive motivations which one refers to as he/she seeks to maximize his/her “control balance desirability” in the process of engaging in deviant behaviour.
3.2 Control Balance Theory and Police Brutality
To date, only one study by Hickman and his colleagues (2001) has explicitly integrated the Control Balance Theory to analyze police misconduct. Recognizing the value of this theory, they attempted to conceptualize and operationalize its key concepts and empirically test it in the occupational context of a police force. They analyzed the survey data of Philadelphia police officers in order to examine whether the “control ratio” of individual officer influenced their probability of reporting their fellow officers who engaged in illicit behaviour. Results of this study supported the Tittle’s theory, and their research was a great leap forward for the study of police behaviour, as it introduced this new theory to a field which had previously relatively lacked theory-based research (Chamlin 1989; Lersch 1998; Wolfe and Piquero 2011). Yet again, although their findings were consistent with Tittle’s theory, their study only focused on officers’ defiance of the sub-cultural construct – “the code of silence” – rather than on the deviation from the code of professional ethics which seeks to discourage police from engaging in misbehaviour against citizens. Moreover, they substantially relied on the original formulation of Tittle’s theory (1995) which has been subject to a great degree of academic criticism (review Braithwaite 1997, Jensen 1999, and Savelsberg 1999 for the criticisms).
Being a theory of general deviance, despite this lack of existing empirical analysis, Tittle’s Control Balance Theory explains very wellwhy some police officers are involved in deviant behavior, including the act of brutality, at specific times and contexts. It serves as a useful foil to study police brutality and suggests that this ultimately is a result of police being on a “power-trip,” as it is commonly referred to. The theory fundamentally emphasizes the individuals’ desires to maximize their control over others, while essentially recognizing the complexity and multidirectional influences of the internal and external factors at play (Braithwaite 1997; Tittle 2004). Although this paper is mainly concerned with the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon, my integration of the theory – as a first attempt – will offer a solid basis for further empirical analysis endeavours in studying police violence. In order to provide a precise understanding, it must be examined complementarily with the two previously discussed theories which have explained the necessary preconditions of brutality: Tittle’s theory of control ratio alone does not provide sufficient explanation as to why only certain types of civilians are subject to much police violence, and it downplays the active role-taking processes of re-socialization which Symbolic Interactionists emphasize.
3.3 Applying the Variables of the Control Balance Desirability to Police Brutality
There are a few important concepts of the Control Balance Theory which need to be further elaborated in relation to police violence: seriousness, control balance desirability, control ratio, opportunity, constraints and self-control. “Seriousness” refers to the possibility of a deviant act to generate potential counter-controls, which will act to reduce one’s level of overall control. It is “a quality inherent to [the] deviant act” itself, but the theory also recognizes the perceptual variations and subjective interpretations across individuals in calculating the degree of the seriousness attached to a given act (Tittle 2004:403). “Control balance desirability” refers to a continuum which embodies “aspects of deviant behavior that bear on maximization of control manipulation, which involves long-range outcomes and effective escape from counter control” (Tittle 2004:406). This may be estimated objectively or subjectively when one determines whether he/she should commit a deviant act.
“Control ratio,” “opportunity,” “constraints,” and “self-control” are the four variables that determine the “control balance desirability.” The first variable consists of personal and social control factors which an individual tries to maximize. It is, as Tittle (2004) argues, the strongest determinant when interfaced with the fact of imbalance, as it “predisposes a person or social entity to become motivated for deviance” (p. 411). The “opportunity” variable acknowledges the basic fact that “deviant acts cannot occur unless they are possible” (Tittle 2004:412). Within a range of possible lines of behaviour that satisfy the “control balance desirability,” police brutality is only executable when there exists a realistic situational condition to victimize a certain entity. For example, attacking an African-American is unlikely if the officer does not come across any African-Americans in the area that he patrols. On the contrary, the “constraint”variable acknowledges factors that may set back the desired control balance ratio (i.e. loss of control) as a composite variable which encompasses the “seriousness” of an offence and the situational risks that are involved in the deviant act. This does not imply that objective rational calculation is in place. Rather, it suggests that one behaves pursuant to his subjective interpretation of his current level of control and the perceived costs and benefits of a deviant act (Tittle 2004).
This overall concept of control is an especially important one in the policing occupation, as officers’ roles in maintaining social order and controlling the population for law enforcement comes with their state-granted monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Fry and Berkes 1983). Permitted to exercise a significant amount of authority, they are also subject to a great degree of internal and external counter-controls (i.e. ones exerted by the media, the public, or the chief of police; Harris 2011). Inevitably, police on duty constantly debate the precise boundaries of the legitimate use of force and the degree to which they exert control over civilians. Put differently, if officers perceive greater risk of punishment for engaging in illicit violence, he will be less likely to abuse his authoriy against innocent civilians (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005).
Organizational subculture is an example of potential force of “constraints” within the police institution. If the subculture which the officer belongs to tolerates the illigimate use of force, it is very likely that he considers this behaviour to entail low levels of “seriousness” and “constraints.” In fact, informal social control seems to be one of the most critical factors that influences street-level officers’ behaviours, more so than other factors, since the nature of police work is that of “low visibility” (Frank 2009:734) and is subject to a “relative lack of [formal] supervision” (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005:561). These working conditions are evidently an indication and a result of inadequate checking and counterbalancing measures. This is in alignment with the Conflict perspective – the first pillar of the integrative theory – that the police institution is inherently oppressive and is the tool of the elites.
The notion of role-taking derived from Symbolic Interactionism also illuminates another factor that affects one’s pursuit for the “control balance desirability.” As such, when officers endorse the “crime fighter” self-identity, they are more likely to place their appropriate and deserved level of control higher. Organizational subcultures and occupational structures which emphasize the “crime fighter” image of the police force further heighten this tendency. The attitudes of citizens – specifically those of disrespect, disobedience, and hostility – may escalate the likelihood of an officer exerting disproportionate authority and aggression in order to reset the “control ratio” to the desired balance. In fact, many studies have empirically demonstrated that the disrespectful demeanor of a citizen is the greatest predictor of unpleasant police-civilian encounters (i.e. Friedrich 1980, Lersch and Feagin 1996 and Westley 1970).
In the context of minority and police interactions, the targeted group eventually absorb or assimilate themselves to the “dominant group’s version of reality,” and consider themselves as oppressed and the victims of the power struggle (Lersch and Mieczkowski 2005; Smith and Holmes 2003; Speight 2007:130). Consequently, they tend to present more hostile and disrespectful attitudes towards police more so than their White counterparts (Black and Reiss 1970; Piliavin and Briar 1964; Sims et al. 2002; Weitzer and Tuch 2005; Wu et al. 2009). Thus, it is partially the demeanor and control balancing of both parties which result in violent altercations: where “both [parties] are anticipating an unpleasant encounter and the situation may escalate even though neither party originally [may have] intended the situation to deteriorate” (Fridell and Pate 1997; Lersch 1998:93). Thus, the police are acutely aware of the inability of the underprivileged to effectively and resourcefully mobilize themselves to exert their control over politicians in order to produce institutional arrangements to check extrajudicial force of the police. This constitutes the low level of realistic measures of “constraints” (i.e. risks to lose their control) as perceived by the police. Therefore, the previously discussed research support the argument that marginalized individuals are much more likely to be targetted as officers attempts to gain control.
Lastly, this theory also recognizes the function of emotion that affects this cognitive decision-making process when an officer determines whether to use illegitimate force. As Tittle argues, the more one is able to control himself, the more capable he is to accurately calculate the short- and long-term “seriousness” and the cost-benefits of control when engaging in deviance. This conception is called “self-control,” and varies from person to person. It is the “strong urge to do something right then, and they often imagine that certain immediate actions that they might take will feel good, will be empowering, and will turn their feelings from denigration to superiority”(Tittle 2004:415). In other words, poorly controlled officers are more likely to be provoked into an act of immediate violence by citizens who do not display the expected signs of obedience and respect. Altoghether, this last variable of “control balance desirability” and Tittle’s emphasis on subjective perception accounts for the individual variations among the police officers, which the two previous theories under-represent.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I have attempted to analyze the phenomenon of police brutality by integrating the Social Conflict perspective, Symbolic Interactionism, and the Control Balance Theory. Discussing the basic logic, the presumptions, important ramifications, and shortcomings thereof, I have dovetailed these theories to offer a broader and modified theoretical framework which explains police violence. The main concern of the paper was to explain why there are only few “bad-apple” officers who are responsible for such ruthless acts, and why they tend to use excessive force against only certain types of citizens given the political context of the society.
Social Conflict Theory provided a rich insight into how class division predisposes individuals by influencing institutional arrangements. The influence of political order on the institutional arrangement of police departments, and the heightened likelihood of the marginalized populations to encounter more violent officers has been presented throughout this paper. It built on the Marxist idea that the powerless are vilified as the criminals, and thus viewed as ones to be controlled. It was argued that although the theory critically captures overall patterns of what seems to be a political construct, it still fails to account for individual variations across police officers.
Symbolic Interactionism, on the other hand, was demonstrated to focus more closely on the mechanisms by which an officer comes to identify himself as a control agent and the ultimate symbol of authority as an individual. Unlike the former, the supporters of this theory see micro-level interactions as the unit of analysis (Matsueda 1992). Its concept of role-taking constituted the re-socialization process which occurs when an officer becomes a formal member of the police institution. The diverse forms and degrees of this re-socialization process in each unit that one is assigned to was pointed out as varying with organizational subculture. Although Symbolic Interactionists mainly view the social structures, or the institutional arrangements, as the product of on-going social processes, I took the perspectives of Conflict Theory to recognize that these arrangements are the product of macro-level power struggles. I argued that the constructed image of marginalized individuals as criminals and the police force as crime fighters must successfully be internalized in order for officers to commit violence against these citizens.
Lastly, the unprecedented application of the Tittle’s Control Balance Theory to the police violence provided us with deeper insight into how an officer cognitively makes decisions whether to use excessive force in a given situation and context. A fundamental quality of human beings – to desire the maximum control over others at all times – was demonstrated throughout (Braithwaite 1997; Tittle 2004). Similarly, police brutality was argued to be a product of police officers’ “control ratio” balancing processes. It was shown that the macro-level political bargaining processes principally determine the degree of “seriousness” and “constraints” on the possible lines of deviant behaviours. In a political landscape which grants the authority to exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force but fails to implement a sufficient checking system to counter the excessive use of force, the re-socializing of the police officers to become “crime fighters” – rather than social workers – ultimately prompts them to victimize the powerless in their search for the “control balance desirability.”
In short, this paper thoroughly hypothesized why one individual officer may commit brutality at a given time and place. The first two theories had explained the necessary macro- and micro-level preconditions of the act of police brutality – which the last theory downplays. On the other hand, since neither of the two provides sufficient explanation as to why police violence occurs at a specific time and place, integrating Tittle’s analysis of micro-level motivations was essential, as it helped us bridge the gap while recognizing various emotional, cognitive, and situational variables. Thus, I attempted to provide more than a piecemeal explanation for the phenomenon of police violence. The insights gained from analyzing three theories together add up to far more than the sum of their parts.
While the analysis presented in this paper remains theoretical, it opens up new directions for future empirical research on police misbehaviour and violence against citizens. Given the multifaceted causal influences illustrated above, there are many possible ways to address these issues of police brutality—particularly, a policy recommendation which recognizes the intricacy of an individual officer’s behaviour and seeks to tackle the issue at all levels would be most beneficial.
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JiHyun Kwon
JiHyun Kwon is a graduating student with an Honours degree in Sociology and a double Minor in International Development Studies and Politics, Law, and Society. Her principal research interests pertain to the criminal justice policies and the ways in which they influence socioeconomically marginalized individuals. She intends to extend her knowledge of the field through studies in Criminology at the graduate level. She was born in South Korea and educated in Canada.